Side-channel attack on labeling CAPTCHAs by Hernandez-Castro, Carlos Javier et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
90
8.
11
85
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  8
 A
ug
 20
09
Side-channel attack on labeling CAPTCHAs
Carlos Javier Hernandez-Castro1, Arturo Ribagorda1, Yago Saez2
1Security Group, Department of Computer Science, Carlos III University, 28911
Leganes, Madrid, Spain
2EVANNAI Group (Artificial Neural Networks and Evolutionary Computation),
Carlos III University, Computer Science Department, Madrid, Spain
{chernand, arturo}@inf.uc3m.es, yago.saez@uc3m.es
Abstract. We propose a new scheme of attack on the Microsoft’s ASIRRA
CAPTCHA which represents a significant shortcut to the intended at-
tacking path, as it is not based in any advance in the state of the art
on the field of image recognition. After studying the ASIRRA Public
Corpus, we conclude that the security margin as stated by their authors
seems to be quite optimistic. Then, we analyze which of the studied pa-
rameters for the image files seems to disclose the most valuable informa-
tion for helping in correct classification, arriving at a surprising discovery.
This represents a completely new approach to breaking CAPTCHAs that
can be applied to many of the currently proposed image-labeling algo-
rithms, and to prove this point we show how to use the very same ap-
proach against the HumanAuth CAPTCHA. Lastly, we investigate some
measures that could be used to secure the ASIRRA and HumanAuth
schemes, but conclude no easy solutions are at hand1.
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1 Introduction
The last decade has seen increasing interest in abusing services provided in the
Internet, mainly for economical reasons. There has been misuse of services like
e-mail account creation for spam sending and phishing, abuse of sites where
anonymous posting is encouraged (Wikipedia, blogs comments, news sites, etc.)
for adding links for commercial promotion, harassment or vandalism. There has
also been abuse of remote voting mechanisms[14]. Automatic (script-guide) site
wandering has also been described as a way to facilitate resource consumption
and thus remote denial-of-service attacks. Anonymous abuse of on-line games,
inclusive for commercial promotion, is not new. Other denial-of-service attacks
on public posting sites (like employment listings or CV reception e-mails ad-
dresses) is also possible. Thus, there are lots of sounding economical reasons to
abuse services provided through the Internet.
The main trend to prevent this automatic abuse has been to develop the
ability to tell humans and computers apart - remotely and through an untrust-
1 This article is part of a research work still in progress
worthy channel. Many tests -generically called CAPTCHAs2 or HIPs3- have
been developed with that aim. Those tests rely on capacities inherent to the
human mind but supposedly difficult to mimic for computers, that is, problems
that have been traditionally hard to solve in computers (as problems that still
remain wide open for Artificial Intelligence researchers).
Moni Naor seems to have been the first to propose theoretical methods of
telling apart computers from humans remotely to prevent the abuse of web ser-
vices in [5]. In 1997, primitive CAPTCHAs were developed by Andrei Broder,
Martin Abadi, Krishna Bharat, and Mark Lillibridge to prevent bots from adding
URLs to their search engine [6]. The term CAPTCHA (for Completely Auto-
mated Turing Test To Tell Computers and Humans Apart) was coined in 2000
by Luis von Ahn, Manuel Blum, Nicholas Hopper and John Langford of Carnegie
Mellon University [3]. At the time, they developed the first CAPTCHA to be
used by Yahoo. Those earlier designs were mostly text-based: the computer chose
a random sequence of letters and rendered them in an image after applying dif-
ferent kinds of distortions. The human challenger, supposedly far better than a
computer in character recognition, was to identify the characters. But even after
graphic distortion and degradation, some approaches have been able to ”read”
them and thus solve the test automatically around 92% of the time [4], specially
so when it is possible to divide the graphic into its constituent letters. Some ap-
proaches have focussed on making this division harder, typically to the expense
of making it also harder to the human challenger.
There are CAPTCHAs that rely on the same foundations as text CAPTCHA
but seem to be slightly stronger, but also more difficult for the common user,
so can only be used as special-purpose CAPTCHAs for certain types of hu-
man clients. Among them there is MAPTCHA, the Mathematical Captcha, that
shows a math formula (typically a limit) and asks the user to write down its nu-
merical value solution. This CAPTCHA, apart from being probably not difficult
to attack by advanced OCR, has other shortcomings in its current form (i.e.: the
answer requested has to be numeric).
1.1 Image CAPTCHAs
General vision seems to be a harder problem than character recognition, so
more designs have focused on using pictures instead - even though most of those
CAPTCHAs do not really rely on a ”general vision problem” but in a downsized
version of categorizing images.
Chew and Tygar[7] were the first to use a set of labeled images to pro-
duce CATPCHAs challenges. For that purpose, they used the labeled associ-
ated with images in Google Image Search. This technique is not well suited for
CAPTCHAs, as Google relates a picture to its description and its surroundings,
so the word ’bicycle’ could refer to a bicycle or to a music band name. Ahn
and Dabbish[8] proposed a new way to label images by embedding the task as a
2 Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
3 Human Interactive Proof
game, called the ”ESP game”. However, it has a fixed number of object classes
(70) and the image database seems not large enough. The site HotCaptcha.com
proposed a way to use a large-scale human labeled database provided by the
HotOrNot.com website, a site that invites users to post photos of themselves
and rate others’ in a numerical scale of ”hotness”. It is true that beauty is in-
fluenced by culture and subjective, but still there is a large consensus on some
beautiful attributes. This proposal is no longer active, and as of Jan-2009 the
site HotCaptcha.com is down. Oli Warner came with the idea of using photos of
kittens to tell computers and humans apart [9]. KittenAuth features nine pic-
tures of cute little animals, only three of which are feline. The problem with
this system is that its database of pictures is small enough (< 100) to manually
classify them, and this limitation seems troublesome even if we apply new meth-
ods involving image distortion. ASIRRA [1] uses a similar approach but using a
giant database of more that 3 million photos from Petfinder.com, a website de-
voted to finding homes for homeless pets, with a daily addition of around 10,000
more pics. Asirra displays 12 images from the database (mostly composed of
dogs or cats images) and asks the user to select the cats in it. As it is using
Petfinder.com web service, it provides a link for adopting each pet, promoting
the aim of Petfinder.com of finding new pet owners.
1.2 Motivation
We do not fully understand yet if all the problems chosen and in use in the
design of current CAPTCHAs are really hard enough, and if their design and
implementation could be error-prone and make them easier for automatic solv-
ing. It is then interesting to try to break current CAPTCHAs and find pitfalls in
their design to make the state-of-the-art advance and get to a point when well
known and tested assumptions give base for more secure CAPTCHAs.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce
the ASIRRA CAPTCHA in greater detail. After this, in Section 3 we describe
the ENT tool, which will be helpful in the attack against ASIRRA described
in Section 4. Then, in Section 5 we examine other works that have investigated
the ASIRRA scheme and explain the differences with our work. In Section 6 we
explain how our new scheme can be used against almost any other type of im-
age CAPTCHAs and show a demonstration involving HumanAuth, and finally,
in Section 7 we extract some conclusions and propose possible improvements
together with future research lines.
2 The ASIRRA CAPTCHA
The ASIRRA CAPTCHA[1] is based on the task of identifying images under two
categories, cats and dogs (ASIRRA stands for ”Animal Species Image Recogni-
tion for Restricting Access”). A challenge consists on a set of 12 photographs,
Fig. 1. ASIRRA CAPTCHA in action
all the same pixel size, each of which represents a cat or a dog. To solve the
CAPTCHA the user has to highlight all the photographs depicting cats and
none depicting dogs. According to [1], ASIRRA ”can be solved by humans 99.6%
of the time in under 30 seconds”, implying a significant advantage in usability
compared with character-based CAPTCHAs.
ASIRRA has some additional features due to its partnertship with PetFinder.com.
It displays pets for adoption that are close to the IP geolocation of the client
receiving the CAPTCHA, and below each image it displays an ”adopt me” link
that redirects the client to a PetFinder.com page with more information about
the pet. ASIRRA developers have nonetheless put great care in these two fea-
tures not affecting the security of their proposal. For example, when an user
selects an ”adopt me” link, the CAPTCHA is invalidated before being redi-
rected to PetFinder.com. They have also put some extra effort in the usability,
introducing schemes to prevent the issuing of difficult to classify images (images
with more than one pet, or pets of two different races, etc.).
For testing its security, ASIRRA authors have developed a classifier based
on histograms of color features described in [1] that is only 56.9% accurate. The
authors state [1] that ”based on a survey of machine vision literature and vision
experts at Microsoft Research, we believe classification accuracy of better than
60% will be difficult without a significant advance in the state of the art”.
3 Description of the ENT tool
The ENT[11] tool is a program comprising a suite of different tests that search
for information density and randomness in a byte sequence. It does so applying
various tests to the sequence of bytes and reporting the numerical results of those
tests. As these tests are useful for evaluating information quantity and random-
ness quality, this results are of interest for evaluating pseudo-random number
generators and studying the output of compression algorithms. In the novel way
presented in this paper, they can also be used for file/image classification.
The tests included in the ENT program are:
– Entropy: information density of the contents of the file, expressed as the
mean number of bits necessary to represent a character of 8 bits (byte). For
example, if the last 4 bits of each byte are always 0110 and the former 4 bits
vary ’randomly’, then the mean entropy of the file would be 4 (4 bits per
byte).
– Compression: this test tells us the size shrink (in percentage) we could ob-
tain if the file was compressed using a lossless compression algorithm of the
Lempel-Ziv type (one pass).
– Chi-square test: this tests computes the expected p-value for a distribution
with 256 degrees of liberty (dividing the file in 8 bit chunks of data). This
p-value represents how frequently a uniform distribution would exceed the
computed value.
– Arithmetic mean: this tests computes the mean value of all the bytes of the
input file.
– Monte-Carlo value for Pi: this tests uses a Monte-Carlo (probabilistic) al-
gorithm to compute the value of Pi, using the input file as the source of
randomness for such algorithm.
– Serial correlation: this test measures how a byte of the file can be approxi-
mated by its preceding byte.
For an idea of the results one can expect of the ENT test, we show the output
obtained when applied to the following input files:
– An ASCII English version of Don Quijote de la Mancha, by Miguel de Cer-
vantes, from the Gutemberg Project 4
– A BMP non-compressed image (posted on the Internet) 5
– A WAV non-compressed sound (posted on the Internet) 6
– A JPEG compressed image from Flickr.com 7
– The Chase, an MP3 compressed music file from the Internet Audio Open
Source Archive 8
test ASCII BMP WAV JPEG MP3
size 2347772 1683594 116904 4914423 2916331
entropy 4.49 7.24 6.16 7.91 7.85
compression 43 % 9 % 22 % 1 % 1 %
chi square 37,346,041.42 2,796,525.96 484,762.37 669,239.83 1,643,472.32
chi square p-value > 0.01 > 0.01 > 0.01 > 0.01 > 0.01
mean 88.92 73.21 125.74 137.88 119.89
Monte-Carlo Pi 4.00 3.45 3.97 2.84 3.20
serial correlation 0.016057 0.537042 0.928775 0.004862 0.168447
The entropy and compression tests give information about data density. The
mean and Monte Carlo Pi tells us about value distribution, the serial correlation
about data interrelation (also related to data redundancy), and the chi square
test is the most sensible to non random data distribution.
4 http://www.gutenberg.org/files/996/996.txt
5 http://www.lossip.com/wp-content/uploads/marc-anthony-y-ricardo-arjona.bmp
6 http://amazingsounds.iespana.es/oceanwaves.wav
7 http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3126/3153559748 b0ee7fd24b o.jpg
8 http://www.archive.org/download/Green-LiveAtTheAQ/TheChase.mp3
Fig. 2. Distribution of classes (different colours) regarding ENT test results
4 Attack against ASIRRA
We have downloaded the ASIRRA Public Corpus, that the developers of ASIRRA
have generously created to help researchers study the security of their proposal.
It is composed of around 25.000 images, classified into two directories named
Cat and Dog, with one half of the images in each class. We then analyzed all of
the jpeg files contained herein with the help of the ENT tool, producing a for-
matted output (in ARFF format, so to be used with Weka [10]) with its results,
after discarding two corrupt files. This were later processed by a classifier which
was able of distinguishing cats and dogs pictures with a nearly 60% accuracy,
without using any kind of image recognition technique.
An especially simple, easy-to-understand classifier is shown in Figure 1 below:
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.meta.AttributeSelectedClassifier
-E "weka.attributeSelection.CfsSubsetEval "
-S "weka.attributeSelection.BestFirst -D 1
-N 5" -W weka.classifiers.trees.J48 -- -C 0.25 -M 2
Relation: catsdogs
Instances: 24998
Attributes: 9
entropy
size
compressionrate
chisqstatistic
arithmean
montepi
errmontepi
corr
class
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
AttributeSelectedClassifier:
Classifier Model
J48 pruned tree
------------------
size <= 32137: Cat (15998.0/7013.0)
size > 32137: Dog (9000.0/3514.0)
=== Stratified cross-validation ===
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 14448 57.7966 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 10550 42.2034 %
Total Number of Instances 24998
=== Confusion Matrix ===
a b <-- classified as
8969 3530 | a = Cat
7020 5479 | b = Dog
In the figure above we can see how the simplest decision tree[13] based on
only the size of a jpeg file is able of distinguishing between cats and dogs with
an accuracy well over 57% over the 24998 images, so significantly better than
random.
A more complex classifier could perform slightly better, reaching a correctly
classified ratio of 58.0326 with a LogitBoost[12] technique with 10 boost itera-
tions and a DecisionStump as the underlying algorithm (see below). These results
are averages taken after a 10-fold cross-validation process.
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.meta.LogitBoost
-P 100 -F 0 -R 1 -L -1.7976931348623157E308 -H 1.0 -S 1 -I 10
-W weka.classifiers.trees.DecisionStump
Relation: catsdogs
Instances: 24998
Attributes: 9
entropy
size
compressionrate
chisqstatistic
arithmean
montepi
errmontepi
corr
class
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
LogitBoost: Base classifiers and their weights
=== Stratified cross-validation ===
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 14507 58.0326 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 10491 41.9674 %
Total Number of Instances 24998
=== Confusion Matrix ===
a b <-- classified as
8288 4211 | a = Cat
6280 6219 | b = Dog
In conclusion, what we have here is that even a very simple and efficient
classifier based on a completely side characteristic of the image files (in this
case, its size) is able of telling apart cats from dogs with a much better than
random accuracy.
This is clearly an undesirable property of the ASIRRA scheme, and, for that
matter, of any CAPTCHA scheme, as if correctly designed they are expected to
be broken only if some major advance in artificial intelligence is achieved.
4.1 ASIRRA Attribute Selection
A natural question that might arise is which of the output values computed
by the ENT tool over the image files are most informative for a side-channel
classification. As can be easily deduced from the simplest classifier shown in the
last section, it seems that the value of the size parameter is the most relevant,
but what about the others? For discovering the most meaningful parameters
for cat and dog image classification, we have performed an attribute selection
process with the Weka [10] classification tool, using a chi-square based evaluator
with a Ranker search method, as shown below:
=== Run information ===
Evaluator: weka.attributeSelection.ChiSquaredAttributeEval
Search: weka.attributeSelection.Ranker -T -1.7976931348623157E308 -N -1
Relation: catsdogs
Instances: 24998
Attributes: 9
[.....]
Evaluation mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Attribute selection 10 fold cross-validation (stratified), seed: 1 ===
average merit average rank attribute
729.115 +-23.245 1 +- 0 2 size
223.755 +-19.423 2 +- 0 4 chisqstatistic
171.656 +-17.037 3 +- 0 5 arithmean
144.709 +-10.347 4 +- 0 1 entropy
81.333 +- 6.923 5.1 +- 0.3 8 corr
73.121 +- 4.512 6 +- 0.45 6 montepi
66.109 +-10.686 6.9 +- 0.3 7 errmontepi
16.297 +- 8.621 8 +- 0 3 compressionrate
As expected, the first attribute in terms of information disclosure merit is
size, with around 729.115, or 3.25 times more relevance than the chi-square
statistic which is in second place, performing slightly better than the arithmetic
mean that, with around 171.656 is a little more informative than file entropy.
All the rest seem to be not too helpful for telling dogs and cats apart, especially
the compression rate.
One can think that this disclosure of classification information by the size
parameter should be very easy to repair. The ASIRRA developers can easily
redesign the image filter applied to the images taken from Petfinder.com, and
process them to have exactly the same size when forming an ASIRRA challenge,
so that the size of all proposed images is identical and, consequently, it reveals
no useful information whatsoever. Unfortunately, this seems not to be the case.
If we remove the size parameter completely, the classification is slightly worse
but still much better than random, as shown below:
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.meta.AttributeSelectedClassifier
-E "weka.attributeSelection.CfsSubsetEval "
-S "weka.attributeSelection.BestFirst -D 1
-N 5" -W weka.classifiers.trees.J48 -- -C 0.25 -M 2
Relation: catsdogs-weka.filters.unsupervised.attribute.Remove-R2
Instances: 24998
Attributes: 8
[.....]
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
AttributeSelectedClassifier:
=== Attribute Selection on all input data ===
Search Method:
Best first.
Start set: no attributes
Search direction: forward
Stale search after 5 node expansions
Total number of subsets evaluated: 29
Merit of best subset found: 0.009
Attribute Subset Evaluator (supervised, Class (nominal): 8 class):
CFS Subset Evaluator
Including locally predictive attributes
Selected attributes: 1,3,4 : 3
entropy
chisqstatistic
arithmean
Classifier Model
J48 pruned tree
------------------
chisqstatistic <= 1330.01
| chisqstatistic <= 1173.43: Cat (4864.0/1981.0)
| chisqstatistic > 1173.43
| | entropy <= 7.971873: Cat (2084.0/905.0)
| | entropy > 7.971873: Dog (627.0/286.0)
chisqstatistic > 1330.01
| entropy <= 7.965789
| | arithmean <= 122.5622
| | | chisqstatistic <= 5825.38
| | | | entropy <= 7.933784
| | | | | entropy <= 7.718804
| | | | | | arithmean <= 104.4152: Cat (11.0/2.0)
| | | | | | arithmean > 104.4152: Dog (43.0/11.0)
| | | | | entropy > 7.718804: Cat (1358.0/482.0)
| | | | entropy > 7.933784
| | | | | chisqstatistic <= 1848.76: Cat (684.0/259.0)
| | | | | chisqstatistic > 1848.76: Dog (670.0/324.0)
| | | chisqstatistic > 5825.38
| | | | entropy <= 7.923559: Cat (2709.0/1260.0)
| | | | entropy > 7.923559: Dog (64.0/18.0)
| | arithmean > 122.5622
| | | chisqstatistic <= 2020: Cat (3969.0/1962.0)
| | | chisqstatistic > 2020: Dog (3749.0/1626.0)
| entropy > 7.965789: Dog (4166.0/1406.0)
=== Stratified cross-validation ===
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 14218 56.8766 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 10780 43.1234 %
Total Number of Instances 24998
Here, the same classifier that was able of obtaining a 57.7966% using all
the attributes is still able of achieving a 56.8766% without the size parameter,
although it struggles to do that, and is forced to construct a much larger and
complex tree than in the previous case.
After discarding the size value, the most informative parameter is the chi-
square value. If we remove both the size and the chi-square value, the rest of
the set of ENT output values are still able of producing a better-than-random
classification (with around a 54.1763% accuracy over the 24998 images of the
Corpus).
Although modifying the chi-square value of the image files to remove it as
we have done below is a much harder task than that corresponding to the size
parameter, it additionally seems not to be the solution to avoid this kind of
side-channel attacks against the ASIRRA CAPTCHA.
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.meta.LogitBoost
-P 100 -F 0 -R 1 -L -1.7976931348623157E308
-H 1.0 -S 1 -I 10 -W weka.classifiers.trees.DecisionStump
Relation: catsdogs-weka.filters.unsupervised.attribute.Remove-R2,4
Instances: 24998
Attributes: 7
[.....]
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
LogitBoost: Base classifiers and their weights:
=== Stratified cross-validation ===
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 13543 54.1763 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 11455 45.8237 %
Total Number of Instances 24998
classifier non-allowed parameters parameters used accuracy
LogitBoost/DecisionStump - all 58.0326 %
J48 pruned tree - size 57.7966 %
J48 pruned tree size entropy, chi-square, mean 56.8766 %
LogitBoost/DecisionStump size, chi-square rest 54.1763 %
5 Other Works
In Philippe Golle’s recent work [2], he presents the strongest attack against
ASIRRA as of Jan-2009 (still unpublished). This attack is based in image pro-
cessing, as it divides the photographs into NxN cells of color and texture (gray-
scale) information, and use that to feed two support-vector machine (SVM)
classifiers that, when used together, are capable of classifying with around a
83% accuracy, thus allowing them to solve the 12-photos challenge with a 10.3%
probability.
For that purpose they collected 13,000 images from the ASIRRA implemen-
tation (publicly available at the ASIRRA website) avoiding duplicates (they de-
tected 6). Then they classified them into Cat (49.3%), Dog (49.7%) and Other
(1.0% - pictures with no recognizable animal, or either both cat and dog). Then
the authors experimented with different color and texture features extracted
from the images. Using those features, they trained support-vector machines
(SVM) classifiers using a 5-fold cross validation (dividing a subset of images into
5 partitions, 4 used for training and 1 for validation) using subsets of various
sizes (reporting average results through 5 experiments with subsets of 5,000 and
10,000 images).
For color processing, the authors subdivide the color space in regions. They
subdivide the HSV (hue, saturation, value) model of color in Ch, Cs and Cv
bands of equal width. Then, for each NxN cell of the image, they create a vector
with a 1 in the region if there is at least one pixel with color in that region. This
approach is boolean-based (recalls on the presence or not of the color) and not
frequency-based (like the color-histogram approach tried by the ASIRRA authors
[1]). They find that color-presence features are more accurate for classifying
cats and dogs than color-histogram features. To explain this counter-intuitive
result, they hypothesize that color-presence features are scale independent (and
not color-histogram), and also that the distribution of color-presence features
is much more regular [2] than the distribution of real-valued color histograms.
With this scheme, the authors reach an 77.1% accurate classification rate based
on a training set of 8,000 images.
For texture processing, the authors experiment with an statistical approach
based in intensity measures in different regions of the image and with a structural
approach, in which a texture is defined as a set of texture tiles in repeated
patterns, finding the later to be more useful for the creation of classifiers. In
this approach, they define a set of textures (of 5x5 pixels) and create a feature
vector of each image with distances from the image to each one of this textures
(normalized in the range [0,1]). Using this method, the authors reach an 80.4%
Fig. 3. HumanAuth CAPTCHA capture with the GigoIt logo as an example
watermark
accurate classification rate based on a training set of 8,000 images. Combining
both methods, they reach an 82.7% accurate classification rate.
This approach is quite interesting and produces an impressive outcome, but
it is rather conventional as it relies in actual imaging processing techniques, ex-
tracting color information and texture patterns, calculating distances between
textures, and using that information in the classification phase, thus effectively
advancing the state-of-the-art in image recognition (at least in the cat/dog in-
stance).
Our approach is completely different: it does not use any technique related
to image processing, but categorizes files by other means and is also likely to be
much more effective in terms of speed, and more general as can be applied to
any image-based CAPTCHA.
Also, as our approach is completely different from the classical approach
presented in [2], both can be combined to obtain an improved classification
ratio.
6 Other CAPTCHAs affected
In this section we describe the results of this side-channel analysis technique
against other interesting CAPTCHA proposal called HumanAuth (http://sourceforge.net/projects/humanauth/).
The HumanAuth CAPTCHA is based on the ability of humans to distinguish
between images with natural and non-natural contents. The source code of the
HumanAuth application comes with a image repository consisting of 45 nature
images and 68 non-nature ones in jpeg format. The idea is quite interesting, and
the CAPTCHA is specially easy for humans and purportedly very difficult for
non-humans.
6.1 HumanAuth image repository
Following an identical approach to that used in the ASIRRA case, we passed
the ENT tool to all the images in the HumanAuth source code, producing an
ARFF file for Weka processing. The best classifier (in this case RandomForest)
was able to show an accuracy rate of 77.8761% (see below), which is significantly
better than the 68
68+45
= 60.177% that a trivial classifier (that always predicts
the larger class) will do.
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.trees.RandomForest -I 10 -K 0 -S 1
Relation: humanauth
Instances: 113
Attributes: 9
[.....]
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
Random forest of 10 trees, each constructed while considering 4 random features.
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 88 77.8761 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 25 22.1239 %
=== Confusion Matrix ===
a b <-- classified as
34 11 | a = nature
14 54 | b = nonnature
In the case of the HumanAuth CAPTCHA, the information disclosure of
the output ENT values is distributed much more evenly, except for the values
related with the MonteCarlo estimation of pi which seem to disclose absolutely no
useful data for the classification. This implies that devising measures to difficult
side-channel attacks against this scheme is even harder than in the already very
difficult case of the ASIRRA CAPTCHA.
=== Run information ===
Evaluator: weka.attributeSelection.ChiSquaredAttributeEval
Search: weka.attributeSelection.Ranker -T -1.7976931348623157E308 -N -1
Relation: humanauth
Instances: 113
Attributes: 9
[.....]
Evaluation mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Attribute selection 10 fold cross-validation (stratified), seed: 1 ===
average merit average rank attribute
38.987 +- 5.975 1.9 +- 1.58 8 corr
34.58 +- 3.872 2.6 +- 1.2 3 compressionrate
32.936 +- 6.025 2.7 +- 0.78 2 size
29.844 +- 4.878 3.9 +- 0.83 1 entropy
29.885 +- 4.57 4.6 +- 1.85 4 chisqstatistic
27.228 +- 1.393 5.3 +- 0.46 5 arithmean
0 +- 0 7.2 +- 0.4 7 errmontepi
0 +- 0 7.8 +- 0.4 6 montepi
Even after completely removing the three most significant attributes for the
HumanAuth classifier, that is correlation, compression rate and size, an SMO
algorithm is able of achieving a 75.2212% accuracy.
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.functions.SMO -C 1.0 -L 0.0010
-P 1.0E-12 -N 0 -V -1 -W 1
-K "weka.classifiers.functions.supportVector.PolyKernel -C 250007 -E 1.0"
Relation: humanauth-weka.filters.unsupervised.
attribute.Remove-R8-weka.filters.unsupervised.
attribute.Remove-R3-weka.filters.unsupervised.
attribute.Remove-R2
Instances: 113
Attributes: 6
entropy
chisqstatistic
arithmean
montepi
errmontepi
class
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
SMO
Kernel used:
Linear Kernel: K(x,y) = <x,y>
Classifier for classes: nature, nonnature
BinarySMO
Machine linear: showing attribute weights, not support vectors.
0.9365 * (normalized) entropy
+ -2.1654 * (normalized) chisqstatistic
+ -0.1669 * (normalized) arithmean
+ 0.0142 * (normalized) montepi
+ 0.0527 * (normalized) errmontepi
+ 0.2322
Number of kernel evaluations: 2089 (76.363% cached)
=== Stratified cross-validation ===
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 85 75.2212 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 28 24.7788 %
Total Number of Instances 113
=== Confusion Matrix ===
a b <-- classified as
17 28 | a = nature
0 68 | b = nonnature
classifier non-allowed parameters parameters used accuracy
RandomForest - all 77.8761 %
SMO correlation, compression rate, size rest 75.2212 %
It seems, therefore, extremely difficult to protect these set of images against
the proposed side-channel analysis, which seriously casts a doubt over the secu-
rity of the derived HumanAuth CAPTCHA.
6.2 HumanAuth CAPTCHA watermarking
To prevent easy image library indexing, the authors of the HumanAuth CAPTCHA
decided to merge a constant PNG image with the random JPG image taken from
the library. To do that, it locates the PNG in a random position into the JPG
canvas and merges both using a level of transparency, so the PNG appears as a
watermark, and does not distort the JPG image as much as to make it difficult
for the human eye to recognise the image. The HumanAuth source includes one
PNG image (a logo) that can be used for testing.
We have created a set of 20,000 images, 10,000 of each class (nature and
non-nature) and have extracted statistical information from them with the ENT
tool, building an ARFF file for Weka processing. We have obtained the following
results.
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.meta.LogitBoost -P 100 -F 0 -R 1 -L -1.7976931348623157E308 -H 1.0 -S 1 -I 10 -W weka.classifiers.trees.DecisionStump
Relation: humanauth
Instances: 20000
Attributes: 9
[.....]
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
LogitBoost: Base classifiers and their weights:
[.....]
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 14517 72.585 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 5483 27.415 %
Kappa statistic 0.4517
Mean absolute error 0.3631
Root mean squared error 0.4229
Relative absolute error 72.6115 %
Root relative squared error 84.5869 %
Total Number of Instances 20000
[.....]
=== Confusion Matrix ===
a b <-- classified as
8093 1907 | a = nature
3576 6424 | b = nonnature
This result can be somewhat expected: with the little randomness introduced
by merging the logo in a random position, the precision of the classifier drops to
72.585 %.
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.trees.J48 -C 0.25 -M 2
Relation: humanauth
Instances: 20000
Attributes: 9
[.....]
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
J48 pruned tree
------------------
[.....]
Number of Leaves : 481
Size of the tree : 961
[.....]
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 18187 90.935 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 1813 9.065 %
Kappa statistic 0.8187
Mean absolute error 0.1113
Root mean squared error 0.2776
Relative absolute error 22.2538 %
Root relative squared error 55.5252 %
Total Number of Instances 20000
[.....]
Using a classification tree of 481 leaves, J48 is able to reach almost a 91 %
accuracy. This is due to the ”repetition” of images, as we have created an image
set of 20,000 images which are statistically close (enough) to the 45 original ones.
This suggests that the initial small set of images, when used with the scheme
proposed by the HumanAuth authors of merging with a watermark, may not
be of use against this type of attack, even though might be enough to prevent
hash-function (like MD5) indexing - which is the intention of the designer. One
can argue that we can choose a different watermark that alters more the original
image, but that would be also at the expense of human visual recognition. It
can be argued that other possible approach could be randomly using a set of
different watermarks, but that would be at the expense of creating an appropriate
set, so we are just moving/distributing the original problem (images can be
characterized because of a not enough uniform distribution).
As can be expected when using as a seed such a small set of images, the
classification accuracy raises as enough samples are given to build a good enough
decision tree, reaching its top logarithmically. The figures given here correspond
to another test set we have created:
Fig. 4. Increase in accuracy and number of nodes with images available
Images Nodes Accuracy
200 21 71.5 %
500 61 74.4 %
1000 85 78.6 %
2000 159 82.1 %
10000 597 88.8 %
20000 929 89.7 %
Other classification schemes show even better results than J48:
=== Run information ===
Scheme: weka.classifiers.trees.RandomForest -I 10 -K 0 -S 1
Relation: humanauth
Instances: 20000
Attributes: 9
[.....]
Test mode: 10-fold cross-validation
=== Classifier model (full training set) ===
Random forest of 10 trees, each constructed while considering 4 random features.
Out of bag error: 0.1207
=== Summary ===
Correctly Classified Instances 18538 92.69 %
Incorrectly Classified Instances 1462 7.31 %
Kappa statistic 0.8538
Mean absolute error 0.1133
Root mean squared error 0.2327
Relative absolute error 22.658 %
Root relative squared error 46.5399 %
Total Number of Instances 20000
[.....]
Theese results are still good after the most significant attributes are removed
from the classification scheme.
classifier non-allowed parameters parameters used accuracy
LogitBoost/DecisionStump - all 72.585 %
J48 - all 90.935 %
RandomForest - all 92.69 %
RandomForest correlation, compression rate, size rest 82.805 %
7 Concluding Remarks
We address in the following, Section 7.1, the generality of the presented attack,
and later some conclusions and ideas for future works.
7.1 Attack Generality
Our approach can be used as a very general analysis tool to realistically estimate
the security parameters of any CAPTCHA proposal, and we believe it will be
advisable to use it in the future before any similar systems are launched to have
adequate, well-reasoned, and founded security parameters and realistic estima-
tions. One of their main advantages is that it does not depend on the underlying
format (image, sound, video, etc.) or problem, and that it could be useful for
avoiding pitfalls such as the existence of some trivial and irrelevant parameter
values (i.e. size) leaking too much class-relevant information.
7.2 Conclusions and Future Work
The ASIRRA CAPTCHA is very interesting, but as our work and this only
previous work [2] have shown, their security estimates are too optimistic. Addi-
tionally, the credit scheme proposed by the authors should not be recommended
(a conclusion also presented in [2]) because it increases a lot the attacker prob-
ability of getting a ticket.
The lessons learned in this analysis are useful to improve other attacks based
on more common approaches -like image processing- or, alternatively, can be
used to improve the security of these CAPTCHA schemes, and this could be an
interesting future work. For example, filtering images taken from Petfinder to
force then to have a much similar average size and less standard deviation could
harden the task of the attacker without affecting the overall good properties of
the ASIRRA proposal.
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